

ER 7-0736

CONFIDENTIAL

JUN 4 1955

and

Lieutenant General S. E. Anderson, USAF
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Anderson:

Your letter of 18 May 1955 requesting intelligence on various aspects of agriculture in the Sino-Soviet Bloc has been considered by the appropriate offices of this Agency, and they advise me that we can supply a study that should assist you in resolving the problem that confronts you in this field.

Considerable research and analysis will be required in order to satisfy your requirements, and even so it is likely that definitive and precise answers cannot be produced. Nevertheless, we are hopeful that our study will be of material benefit in your analysis of pertinent weapons systems.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] of our Office of Research and Reports will contact [redacted] of your Group in order to coordinate this work to the fullest possible extent.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

25X1 OCh/E/RR: [redacted]
25X1 (26 May 1955)
25X1 Rewritten:DDI: [redacted] jm
25X1 (3 June 1955)

Distribution:

0 & 1 - Addressee	1 - ODh/E/RR
2 - DCI	1 - D/M/RR
2 - DDI	2 - AD/RR

DOCUMENT NO. [redacted]
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S (B) 2a11
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2/9/81
AUTH: HQ 70-2
REVIEWER: [redacted]

Defense

~~SECRET~~

Executive Registry
7-0497



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

18 May 1955

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

The Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, in the course of conducting a study of the operational aspects of overt biological warfare, has noted that strongly divergent conclusions have been reached in current studies by other agencies of the military establishment of the military value of the food BW target system. Resolution of this question requires that certain basic intelligence uncertainties be resolved so that future analyses may be based upon factual data or may utilize agreed estimates and assumptions in areas in which it can be established that factual data cannot be secured.

25X1

Details of the information required for these purposes, as discussed with [redacted] of your Office of Research and Reports, are given in the enclosure. It appears that several months of work would be required to provide the necessary information but, since the question of the military value of food production as a BW target system cannot finally be analytically resolved without it, it is believed that the considerable effort involved is justified. Your assistance in providing WSEG with this study will be greatly appreciated. Should further liaison be required it may be accomplished through Mr. Joseph H. Lewis of WSEG.

Sincerely,

1 Enclosure
Details of information
required

G. E. ANDERSON
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

MAY 26 1955
USAF

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR EVALUATIONS OF FOOD
PRODUCTION AS A BW TARGET SYSTEM

1. Current food production target system studies employ estimates of enemy food stockpiles which differ by as much as 5 million metric tons in USSR grain stocks alone. Estimates of the food stock situation in the USSR and Satellites for the 1955-1960 period are required.

2. Information is required of the animal draft power contribution to Bloc food production in the same time period.

What is needed are:

a. Estimates for the USSR and Satellites of the caloric contribution per type of crop and per type producing area (whether surplus producing or not) from animal draft power; and

b. Estimates of the reduction in output to be expected from reductions in available animal draft power.

3. Information is also needed on the Bloc pattern of use of animal fertilizers on food crops. What is required is information for establishing the reductions in output to be expected per type crop and type of producing area, together with the time lag involved, if animal fertilizer is withheld or its use reduced.

SECRET